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Translated by Bl. Jackson.
St Basil the Great Resources Online and in Print
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80 Pages (Homilies: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
Page 77
4. Virtues exist in us also by nature, and the soul has affinity with them not by education, but by nature herself. We do not need lessons to hate illness, but by ourselves we repel what afflicts us, the soul has no need of a master to teach us to avoid vice. Now all vice is a sickness of the soul as virtue is its health. Thus those have defined health well who have called it a regularity in the discharge of natural functions; a definition that can be applied without fear to the good condition of the soul. Thus, without having need of lessons, the soul can attain by herself to what is fit and conformable to nature. [1709] Hence it comes that temperance everywhere is praised, justice is in honour, courage admired, and prudence the object of all aims; virtues which concern the soul more than health concerns the body. Children love [1710] your parents, and you, "parents provoke not your children to wrath." [1711] Does not nature say the same? Paul teaches us nothing new; he only tightens the links of nature. If the lioness loves her cubs, if the she wolf fights to defend her little ones, what shall man say who is unfaithful to the precept and violates nature herself; or the son who insults the old age of his father; or the father whose second marriage has made him forget his first children?
With animals invincible affection unites parents with children. It is the Creator, God Himself, who substitutes the strength of feeling for reason in them. From whence it comes that a lamb as it bounds from the fold, in the midst of a thousand sheep recognises the colour and the voice of its mother, runs to her, and seeks its own sources of milk. If its mother's udders are dry, it is content, and, without stopping, passes by more abundant ones. And how does the mother recognise it among the many lambs? All have the same voice, the same colour, the same smell, as far at least as regards our sense of smell. Yet there is in these animals a more subtle sense than our perception which makes them recognise their own. [1712] The little dog has as yet no teeth, nevertheless he defends himself with his mouth against any one who teases him. The calf has as yet no horns, nevertheless he already knows where his weapons will grow. [1713] Here we have evident proof that the instinct of animals is innate, and that in all beings there is nothing disorderly, nothing unforeseen. All bear the marks of the wisdom of the Creator, and show that they have come to life with the means of assuring their preservation.
The dog is not gifted with a share of reason; but with him instinct has the power of reason. The dog has learnt by nature the secret of elaborate inferences, which sages of the world, after long years of study, have hardly been able to disentangle. When the dog is on the track of game, if he sees it divide in different directions, he examines these different paths, and speech alone fails him to announce his reasoning. The creature, he says, is gone here or there or in another direction. It is neither here nor there; it is therefore in the third direction. And thus, neglecting the false tracks, he discovers the true one. What more is done by those who, gravely occupied in demonstrating theories, trace lines upon the dust and reject two propositions to show that the third is the true one? [1714]
Does not the gratitude of the dog shame all who are ungrateful to their benefactors? Many are said to have fallen dead by their murdered masters in lonely places. [1715] Others, when a crime has just been committed, have led those who were searching for the murderers, and have caused the criminals to be brought to justice. What will those say who, not content with not loving the Master who has created them and nourished them, have for their friends men whose mouth attacks the Lord, sitting at the same table with them, and, whilst partaking of their food, blaspheme Him who has given it to them?
[1709] This is the Stoic doctrine. "Stoicorum quidem facilis conclusio est; qui cum finem bonorum esse senserint, congruere naturae, cumque ea convenienter vivere." cf. Cic., De Fin. iii. 7, 26, and De Nat. D. i. 14, and Hor., Ep., i. x. 12. "Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet." So the Stoics' main rule of life is homologoumenos te phusei zen. But with Basil this apparent disregard of the doctrine of original sin and the need of grace for redemption must be understood in the light of the catholic doctrine that sin is the corruption of human nature (cf. Art. ix. of Original or Birth Sin), which nature, though corrupt and prone to evil, retains capacities for good. But these capacities do need grace and training. cf. Basil's Homily on Ps. xlv. 166. "What is said about the Saviour had a double sense on account of the nature of the Godhead and the Economy of the incarnation. So, looking to the humanity of God, it is said thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity,' instead of saying the rest of men by toil and discipline and careful attention mostly attain a disposition towards good and an aversion from vice. But thou hast a kind of natural relationship to good and alienation from iniquity.' And so to us, if we will, it is not hard to acquire a love of righteousness and a hatred of iniquity." i.e. In Christ, redeemed humanity loves good, and all men naturally' do need toil and discipline. The heredity of sin is recognised by Basil. (e.g. in Hom. in Famen. 7.) Man fell from grace given, and must return to it. (Serm. Ascet. in init.) It must always be remembered that questions of original sin, the will, and grace never had the same importance in the Greek as they had in the Latin church. cf. Dr. Travers Smith on St. Basil (c. ix. p. 108) and Boehringer (Das Vierte Jahrhundert. Basil, p. 102) who remarks: Wenn er auch noch von einer "Wieder herstellung des freien Willens, den wir zu brauchbaren Gefaessen fuer den Herrn und zu jedem guten Werke faehig Werden" (De spir. sanct. 18) spricht, so hat er dies doch nirgends begruendet, obschon er bei der Besprechung der Folgen des Falls zuweilen sich aeussert, es sei der Mensch der von dem Schoepfer erhaltenen Freiheit beraubt worden. Im Allgemeinen setzt er den freien Willen auch nach dem Fall im Menschen so gut wieder Voraus, wie vor dem Fall, so dass jene Aeusserungen kaum mehr als den Werth einer Redensart haben. Im Ganzen eriunert seine Darstellung wieder an diejenige des Athanasius, dessen Einfluss Man nicht verkennen kann.
[1710] In Eph. vi. the word is "obey."
[1711] cf. Eph. vi. 4.
[1712] Fialon quotes Luc. ii. 367-370: "Praeterea teneri tremulis cum vocibus haedi Cornigeras norunt matres, agnique petulci Balantum pecudes: ita, quod natura reposcit, Ad sua quisque fere decurrunt ubera lactis."
[1713] cf. Ovid (Halieut. ad init.): "Accepit mundus legem; dedit arma per omnes, Admonuitque sui. Vitulus sic namque minatur, Qui nondum gerit in tenera jam cornua fronte."
[1714] cf. Plutarch (pot. ton z.phr. k.t.l 726). hoi de dialektikoi phasi ton kuna to dia pleionon diezeugmeno chromenon en tois poluschidesin atrapois sullogizesthai pros heauton etoi tende to therion hormeken e tende e tende; alla men oute tende oute tende, tende loipon ara. But the dog is said to smell the first, the second, and the third. If he started off on the third without smelling, he would reason. As it is, there is no "syllogism."
[1715] Also taken from Plutarch (potera ton z 726), who tells stories of a dog found by King Pyrrhus on a journey, and of Hesiod's dog.
Reference address : https://www.elpenor.org/basil/hexaemeron.asp?pg=77
